This paper systematically investigates and debunks this argument. However, weak hash constructions continue to be used in various cryptographic constructions within mainstream protocols such as TLS, IKE, and SSH, because practitioners argue that their use in these protocols relies only on second preimage resistance, and hence is unaffected by collisions. In response to high-profile attacks that exploit hash function collisions, software vendors have started to phase out the use of MD5 and SHA-1 in third-party digital signature applications such as X.509 certificates.

Session Chair: Kenny Paterson, RHUL Transcript Collision Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE and SSH He also writes a popular blog on cryptographic engineering. He has worked with newspapers to analyze documents from the Snowden cache.

He is a member of the teams that developed the Zerocash anonymous payment system, and has been a member in the teams that recently exposed serious vulnerabilities in major TLS implementations. He specializes in applied cryptography, including anonymous cryptocurrencies and secure messaging protocols. Matthew Daniel Green is an Assistant Professor at the John Hopkins University Information Security Institute. I’ll focus primarily on two recent incidents: the 2015 hack of Juniper Networks, which led to serious vulnerabilities in widely-trusted VPN devices and the recent efforts by governments to obtain “cryptographic backdoors” into end-to-end encryption systems that are increasingly popular on smartphones.ĭr. In this talk I’ll cover the problem of establishing trust in an environment where trust has been broken - subverted, in some cases by malicious attackers, and in others by governments.

But sometimes even we researchers aren’t paranoid enough. Session 5: MISC: Cryptocurrencies, Captchas, GameBotsĪbstract: Security research is an exercise in paranoia. (open to all Workshop and Symposium attendees) Understanding and Enhancing Online Privacy (UEOP) Workshop

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